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This article assesses the need for major re-engineering of the
police service in England and Wales to project and sustain the
workforce modernisation programme in England and Wales. It
argues that having avoided the bureaucratic cul-de-sac that
police mergers represented, a real opportunity for effective
reform has now arisen. This reform would encompass immedi-
ate delegation to basic command units of manpower budgets
and the determination of policing services at this level. The
article draws on the experience of one chief officer who was to
confront the problems of bureaucratic inertia within his own
police force and some organisational practices that served to
undermine police service delivery. It considers the current
problems surrounding the centralised control of police budgets
and the impact of this on the ability of BCU Commanders to
sustain effective reassurance policing. The article also assesses
the impact and future implications of workforce modernisation
along with recent evaluations of the PCSO and ‘mixed-
economy teams’ from pilot sites. Finally the article draws on
recent experience from one police force Chief Officer Team to
evaluate the continuing problem of police organisational cul-
ture particularly in relation to workforce modernisation and the
future expansion of the role of police staff within police forces
in England and Wales.
Introduction
The 2006 summer announcement by the Home Secretary finally
buried the programme of regional police mergers. Instead of
mergers the Home Office now wants collaboration between
police forces and also the introduction of workforce modernisa-
tion (Home Office, 2006). In addition some features of the police
organisation need evaluation for possible major re-engineering to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the police service.
These are: current management structures and the absence
of delegated budgets; a need to identify effective spans of control
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within BCUs; and the current police hierarchy, where eight
ranks continue to exercise a managerial responsibility over the
police constable. Additionally, recent experience in one regional
police force suggests the interface between police officers
and police staff requires fundamental re-evaluation. This would
embrace the police organisational culture along with the less-
than-credible management skills exhibited by a number of senior
police managers within the police service.
Sunset over Northallerton
The clear commitment to the enforced merger plan propounded
by Charles Clarke as Home Secretary was to be supported
among a small number of chief constables. These were expected,
however, to be the beneficiaries of reform by their being
appointed to run the new ‘super-forces’. One regional force was
likely to have been led by the chief constable of North York-
shire, who was expected to take responsibility for the merger of
the three Yorkshire police forces. John Reid, however, was
finally not to be persuaded of the value of such amalgamations.
This may have reflected only in part an earlier position taken
within the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU) in 2004 that
amalgamation represented the very last option that should be
contemplated in terms of improving police efficiency (PMSU,
2004). This policy position may have been resurrected by PMSU
with the demise of Charles Clarke, who, with a small number of
senior police officers, proved to be a major proponent of the
merger programme.
As these plans unfolded it became evident that, while they
may have been supported by a small number of chief police
officers and HMIC, they did not meet with popular approval.
This was to be highlighted by way of elaborate public consulta-
tion exercises undertaken by a number of police forces and
police authorities. These included wide public consultation meet-
ings conducted by Cleveland and West Mercia police authorities.
It appeared that the police reform merger plan was very largely
‘producer-driven’ rather than ‘consumer-led’, which served to
contradict the Prime Minister’s own aims for public services
reform (Cabinet Office, 2003). Nor was it clear how much the
total cost of police mergers might prove to be. As no evidence
was to be cited within HMIC’s Report Closing the Gap and no
evaluation of the costs of previous amalgamations was to be
provided either, there was a justified fear that costs could prove
to be very substantial (Brain, 2006).
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Subsequently it was to be reported that the chief officer and
police authority of Cumbria was to ask for and receive an
apology from the Prime Minister in connection with the pro-
posed merger of Cumbria and Lancashire constabularies and
the decision not to go forward with it. Yet, as was to be noted,
the merger had been decided between the chief constables of the
respective police forces, who aimed to push this through in
the absence of any support for this largely unwanted develop-
ment among the local public.
The Prime Minister’s formal apology ignored the fact that
the community had demonstrated strong opposition to the
merger. This had been manifested by way of popular petitions
opposing amalgamation organised locally by members of parlia-
ment (Gilbert, 2006). It might, ironically, have been more
appropriate if the apology from the Prime Minister had been
more immediately directed to the residents of Cumbria. These
came very close to experiencing the worst excesses of pro-
fessional control of a public service in the determination of
its structure and thereafter the level and standard of service
delivery.
Managing Reform in the Police Service
The remote and centralised bureaucracies that the planned 12
regional forces would have created actually would have resulted
in the appearance rather than the reality of reform. The lengthy
bureaucratic exercise initiated by amalgamation also would have
served to ensure that real public service reform could be side-
lined. Priorities of chief officers and senior managers would
inevitably have been directed to police force reorganisation even
though the benefits of this had never been clearly established
(Loveday, 2006).
The need for reform remains clear yet this relates very
largely to the internal management structure within the police
service. This would specifically embrace the management of
BCUs and the need to identify effective spans of control within
it. To date there has been no independent analysis of what
constitutes a viable BCU size and this has been reflected in the
way the size of these units have, rather like police forces, grown
in terms of police establishments over the last decade.
As originally predicted, the viable size of the BCU was
around 250 police establishments but this quickly expanded to
400 (O’Byrne, 2001). In the absence of any objective assessment
some BCUs now have establishments of over 1,000 police
officers, which effectively undermines the management rationale
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identified as the basis for their creation (O’Byrne, 2001). As
originally argued, the BCU with 250 officers provided a span of
control that effectively could be exercised by one senior officer.
Additionally, the BCU also provided a flatter unit for police
delivery, which helped reduce the traditional police hierarchy.
The growth in size of the BCU has, in many police forces,
served to undermine the earlier rationale for these units. More-
over, as they have grown in size the need for an extended police
hierarchy has also been re-established. Additionally, the aim to
delegate managerial responsibility to BCU commanders has also
been confounded as the majority of these officers do not have
effective control over the budget and have no immediate
responsibility for police manpower. To some degree this prob-
lem has been compounded by the government’s commitment to
keeping up police force establishment by way of the Crime
Fighting Fund (CFF).
Yet the reality within many police forces continues to be that
central police headquarters is not prepared to address effective
delegation as this could raise major questions about its own
future role. Public service reform remains, however, committed
to delegating financial responsibility down to those closest to
consumers of the service (Cabinet Office, 2003: 3). As in many
other public services, police service manpower spending
accounts for approximately 80% of all spending and is the single
most critical spending area for operational police managers. But,
as a survey conducted for the Police Superintendents’ Associ-
ation in 2003 was to discover, for most BCU Commanders the
only immediate areas of responsibility not requiring referral to
Police HQ proved to be ‘office equipment’ and ‘overtime pay-
ment’ (Police Superintendents’ Association, 2003).
In the absence of effective delegation of manpower budgets
to BCUs there may, ironically, be less commitment to the
encouragement and implementation of police reform. This may
be particularly the case in relation to the further use of police
staff and the extended ‘police family’. Evidence suggests that
BCU Commanders acting independently would be prepared to
embark far more on the wider recruitment of police staff than on
that of police officers. They are aware that the wider use of
police staff currently offers much greater value for money than
the simple increase in police establishment (Loveday & Reid,
2003). This assessment would, of course, provide a useful
spring-board for the greater implementation of the workforce
modernisation programme currently being piloted in a number of
police force areas.
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Yet there is much to recommend the internal management
reform identified within the BCU structure. Delegated budgets
and freedom given to commanders to use those budgets could
provide the most effective method of improving police service in
the BCU area. It might also provide the trigger for important
changes in local delivery of service. To date, however, very little
has been achieved in either arena. This is not unconnected to a
degree of suspicion and opposition to it among both chief
officers and HMIC (HMIC, 1998: 2).
This opposition is reflected in the demand for ‘corporacy’
expressed currently by many chief officers. In effect ‘corporacy’
places great importance on centralised management that has been
the traditional characteristic of police forces. It has at the same
time, however, been a characteristic that has sustained extended
police hierarchies now seen as a marked impediment to effective
service delivery.
Police Management and Service Delivery
Delegation down to BCU level in addition to reducing police
hierarchies may also go some way to provide an opportunity for
challenging workforce practices that blight the delivery of police
services. Although no detailed evaluation of these practices can
be attempted here, it is accepted that there is a need for a
significant review of these issues. While most police forces have
been encouraged to act on these practices, the problems asso-
ciated with ill-health, injury, early retirements, shift patterns and
police allowances remain the subject of continuing concern.
Although a number of chief constables have taken up the
challenge, the experience of the (then) chief constable of West
Yorkshire proved to be instructive. He related how he had
confronted a system where it was accepted that officers might
seek early retirement on quite spurious grounds but it was
accepted as entirely legitimate because it was seen as ‘part of the
system’ (Hellawell, 2002: 246–7). He noted, however, that:
There was a twist to the ill-health scenario. If an officer
could prove he was retiring as the result of injury on duty he
received an enhanced pension in the form of a lump sum and
annual payments of several thousand pounds for the rest of
his life, all of which was tax-free. More and more officers
were taking advantage of this rule and compared with others
my force had the largest percentages of officers receiving
enhanced payments. (Hellawell, 2002: 246)
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The same chief officer also investigated officers who had retired
on ill-health grounds. He discovered a range of abuses where
officers with attractive pensions were working in a variety of
capacities from which their claim of ill-health should in theory
have precluded them. Analysing a number of ill-health retire-
ments, this officer argued that there were in fact many claims
that appeared to be entirely spurious (Hellawell, 2002: 248).
Interestingly, while this chief officer quickly recognised the real
costs of these claims, many of his fellow officers did not share
his concern. As he stated about his ACPO colleagues:
I shared my force’s ill-health record and the methods I
adopted to deal with it with my fellow chief constables, who
were not particularly interested as it was not a big issue for
them and took no remedial action. The result is that in the
past decade police sickness and ill–health retirements have
spiralled out of control becoming a major drain on finances.
(Hellawell, 2002: 249)
Nor did the problem concern only early retirements. It also
became apparent that many working practices had over the years
been introduced not on the basis of need but in effect to ‘keep
the workforce happy’ (ibid.). One example cited by the same
chief officer concerned a police officer’s ‘place of duty’. Here, if
an officer had to work anywhere else on a temporary basis they
would be automatically entitled to compensation for both travel
and meals. Yet if the officer worked at the new location for more
than 60 days the benefit ceased. This chief officer was to
discover that this not surprisingly explained the large number of
‘peripatetic squads’ who, he argued, abused this regulation
systematically:
Peripatetic squads claimed – every day they worked –
wherever they were. Their supervisors would arrange for
them to spend the sixty-first day in a different location so
that the sixty-day clock might start to run again and they
could go on drawing benefit. Officers could claim reimburse-
ment for travel even if their temporary places of duty were
closer to their home than their normal station. (Hellawell,
2002: 250)
Further issues confronted by this officer included ‘over-
manning’ problems. In nearly every incident investigated ‘at
least 3 and usually 4 officers were involved each from a different
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department and with little coordination between them’ (Hella-
well, 2002: 251). The process could also be very time-
consuming. As a result, victims effectively waited on the police
who controlled the nature and timing of their response rather
than the police service responding to them.
While CID were to claim that they were under-resourced,
internal investigation highlighted how in West Yorkshire spe-
cialist departments operated as closed shops and certain depart-
ments (particularly CID) were disproportionately funded bcause
80% of the force overtime budget went to the detectives con-
stituting only 13% of the full establishment (Hellawell, 2002:
252). It was also discovered that the CID had excessive over-
heads in terms of supervisory staff vehicles and buildings.
Within this CID department one sergeant supervised three
constables and one inspector supervised two sergeants. They also
had one quarter of all superintending ranks. In the uniform
division the ratios were far higher (Hellawell, 2002: 253). The
decision to deal with these anomalies came for this chief
constable at great personal cost. He was publicly harangued by
intoxicated CID officers at a Federation Meeting held in central
Leeds. His family home was subjected to nuisance calls,
attempted burglaries and finally extensive criminal damage
(Hellawell, 2002: 255). Despite CID opposition, the reforms
pursued by the chief officer reflected the fact that uniformed
officers had carried the burden of police service delivery. In
effect they:
Carried all the vacancies and as a consequence of being
under-manned suffered the highest rate of injury and assault
on duty, since it was they who had to deal with violent
incidents. They carried the highest crime load; they were
under the most pressure and they made the most arrests
and conducted most interviews. They had to deal with the
broadest range of issues as they were the first on the scene
whether it be a murder, a road accident or a pub fight. They
were the lowest paid and the least experienced as quite
understandably everyone worked to escape from the position
of uniformed constable. (Hellawell, 2002: 260)
A further problem relating to that of police hierarchy also was to
be highlighted by this officer. This concerned the internal organ-
isational pressure to create more senior posts that inevitably
came at the expense of front-line officers. Their numbers were to
be eroded by increases in supervisory staff. The result of upward
pressure on senior posts proved to be startling.
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If you visit any police station in this country during the day
you will find almost as many people of rank on duty as
constables out on the streets. What would your reaction be if
that were so in schools or hospitals? (Hellawell, 2002: 364)
Need for Local Management of the Workforce
The workforce problems identified within one police force could
well be equally applicable to others. Yet if the application of
‘tenure’ has radically altered the composition of the CID and
eroded the supervisory advantages previously experienced within
this department, many problems remain. This may continue to
pertain while the extended police hierarchy operates and where
delegation of manpower budgets to local commanders is effect-
ively impeded by police headquarters. Yet only by delegating
budgets are internal workforce problems likely to be effectively
challenged. This is because locally controlled budgets work to
expose and highlight wasteful or unjustifiable spending patterns
and service costs that are less apparent at the top of the
organisation because specific spending patterns can be hidden
within the overall police budget.
Where local commanders are responsible for service and
spending there may well be pressure to achieve ‘value for
money’. This would not sit very easily at a local level alongside
spurious claims for ill-health or injury retirements. Where
budgets are devolved, local commanders can be expected to
make precise judgements about these issues. They are unlikely
to support working practices that erode and impact on their own
budgets.
The need for effective management delegation particularly in
relation to Human Resources (HR) management was identified in
West Yorkshire, where the decision was made early on to
explore the opportunities of giving local commanders immediate
responsibility for local budgets. Prior to this, all decisions in
West Yorkshire had been made at headquarters at ACPO rank:
Before my arrival all decisions were to be made in head-
quarters. The territorial commanders had no control of their
budgets, the number or nature of their staff, buildings,
vehicles or equipment (even replacement of a pair of gloves
had to be authorised by an assistant Chief Officer). Conse-
quently territorial commanders didn’t really manage and had
limited means of manoeuvre within the constraints laid down
at the top. (Hellawell, 2002: 256)
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In order to provide a stronger management base at local BCU
level the decision was taken to devolve responsibility for all
spending to this level. Headquarters staff were given a general-
ised responsibility for setting and monitoring force efficiency
and effectiveness. A ‘simple but fundamental decision’ to
devolve virtually all budgets onto operational commanders ‘met
with their near universal support’. This meant that these officers
were made responsible for multimillion-pound budgets. ‘Those
in headquarters who had hitherto controlled the supply of money
and resources were against the proposal because it lessened
their power and influence’ (Hellawell, 2002: 257). A further
review at headquarters was initiated to identify those officers
who provided a direct service to the public or who required
police powers or police training to do their job. For officers who
filled none of these criteria their posts were to be civilianised
while they were returned to operational duties. Overall these
reforms were to contribute significantly to reducing police
force overheads while increasing the number of officers on the
streets (ibid.).
Lessons learned from this police force were not, however,
picked up by other chief officers, either then or later. Evidence of
this is the way police headquarters continues to retain immediate
responsibility for police budgets and police manpower.
Non-Delegation of Police Budgets
The apparent failure of chief officers either to learn from or
implement the lessons arising from the West Yorkshire example
were highlighted in a survey of all BCU commanders conducted
for the Police Superintendents’ Association in 2003. This survey
asked commanders inter alia to provide details of budgetary
decisions they could make unilaterally and those that had to be
made either in conjunction with police HQ or only by police HQ.
The results, shown in Figure 1, exposed a startling insight into
the unreformed nature of current police financial management
and the largely negative impact of the extended police hierarchy
at that time.
The single most important budget item, that of manpower, is
not delegated to BCU commanders in most instances. Yet these
officers are in the best position to make a judgement as to the
most efficient and effective manpower profile for the BCU area.
Ironically, as earlier identified by Bayley (1994) in relation to
many American police departments, delegated financial respons-
ibility rarely goes beyond that of minor expenditure on office
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furniture, while the big spending is tightly controlled at head-
quarters (Police Superintendents’ Association, 2003).
When the strait-jacket of the Crime Fighting Fund, which
places primacy on the employment of police officers over police
staff, is added to this extremely circumscribed financial role it
becomes immediately clear that BCU commanders effectively
Table 1 What decisions BCU Commanders can make without
reference to Force HQ and what control they have over the
budget
Base: All
respondents (223) Respons-
ibility
Full
control of
budget
Partial
control of
budget
No
control
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Office equipment 87 80 18 2
Operations
support 38 23 37 40
Vehicle fleet 27 21 49 30
Crime support 21 16 34 50
Management info 42 20 37 43
IT 22 14 58 27
Property
management 22 10 61 29
Human resources 32 22 43 35
Police pay 13 32 24 43
Training 29 14 57 29
Overtime budget 77 79 20 1
Officer staffing
levels 37 26 36 38
Civilian staffing
levels 42 38 34 29
Maintenance 52 32 52 15
Allowances, e.g.
vehicle and
telephone 50 14 58 27
Income
generation, e.g.
selling police time
to football
grounds 49 40 39 21
Source: Police Superintendents’ Association (2003).
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command little at all. They remain almost wholly driven by and
dependent on centralised management direction and decision
making based at police HQ level.
Thus the BCU commander’s role provides in effect the
appearance rather than the reality of delegated command. The
evidence for this can be found in the responses of BCU com-
manders when asked what responsibilities they would like to see
delegated (see Table 2 below). The application of central per-
formance targets by government has also acted as a brake on the
limited discretion exercised by BCU commanders, as targets
have tended to reinforce the traditional top-down command and
control approach. This has seen the resurrection of the central
Table 2 Whether commanders would like less, the same, or
more control over budgets
Base: All
respondents (223) Less
control
The same
level of
control
More
control
Not
stated
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Office equipment – 66 22 12
Operations
support – 39 44 16
Vehicle fleet 1 30 59 10
Crime support – 34 50 17
Management info – 43 38 18
IT – 43 42 14
Property
management 2 43 42 13
Human resources 1 27 61 11
Police pay 1 39 46 14
Training 1 34 52 13
Overtime budget – 63 26 11
Officer staffing
levels 1 26 62 10
Civilian staffing
levels 1 34 55 10
Maintenance 2 46 38 14
Allowances, e.g.
vehicle and
telephone 1 58 25 16
Source: Police Superintendents’ Association (2003).
The Police Journal, Volume 80 (2007) 13
features that characterised the classical school of police organisa-
tional management (Souryal, 1995: 485). A consequence of this
revival of the classical management approach has been pressure
towards the narrowing of spans of control and an extension of
the police hierarchy. This is reflected in the ever-increasing size
of BCUs, which has required a strengthening of the police
hierarchy to manage these enlarged units of policing (Loveday,
forthcoming a).
Police Manpower Availability at BCU level
In spite of the creation of BCUs and their responsibility for the
policing of their areas it is evident that Police HQs still deter-
mine budgets and have influence, if not total control, over the
operational functions of the BCU. This is manifested in a
number of ways.
Perhaps the most significant of these, given the importance
of visible policing, is manpower availability at BCU level. Once
again a survey of BCU commanders revealed the limited power
given to local commanders over what continues to be the
primary resource at this level. In the analysis of the abstraction
rate (a highly significant element of manpower availability) it
was discovered that in many BCUs the total number of officers
available for duty could be eroded by the impact of abstractions
(see Table 3 below). The abstraction rate reflects the sickness
and training withdrawals over which the BCU commander has
little influence. This may also extend to the matter of vacant
posts and is significant, particularly if these vacancies are heavily
loaded towards the beat constable. This problem within the
police organisation has been identified by police managers and
others over many years and reflects a continuing bias towards the
Table 3 Overall abstraction in BCUs
Base: All respondents (223) Proportion falling
into band
Abstraction rate (%)
0–10% 12
11–20% 31
21–25% 9
26–30% 17
31–40% 15
41%+ 10
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provision of specialised squads at the expense of visible patrol
work (Mervyn Jones, 1980; Loveday, 1999; Hellawell, 2002).
The issue of vacancies, when taken alongside that of sickness
and training, can reduce availability of staff significantly, as
shown in Table 4 below. Within the same survey BCU com-
manders were asked to identify abstraction rates that were a
direct result of Police HQ requirements. This demonstrated that a
very high proportion of BCUs (81%) could expect to lose
between 5% and 10% of manpower as a consequence of Police
HQ demands (see Table 5 below).
Interestingly, commanders within the same survey who
reported that they had received either ‘not much’ or ‘no support’
from the chief officer team experienced a much higher than
average level of abstractions due to HQ requirements than those
who reported that they did receive support. While these data may
be, to a degree, subjective and should be treated with some
Table 4 Overall abstraction in BCUs due to sickness, training
and vacant posts
Base: All respondents (223) Proportion falling
into band
Abstraction rate (%)
0–7% 12
8–15% 46
16–20% 17
21–25% 8
26–30% 4
31%+ 5
Table 5 Overall abstraction in BCUs due to HQ requirements
Base: All respondents (223) Proportion falling
into band
Abstraction rate (%)
0–5% 61
6–10% 20
11–15% 6
16–20% 2
21%+ 2
Source: Police Superintendents’ Association (2003).
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caution, it still provides further evidence of the lack of control
exercised by local commanders at an operational level over
police availability and police patrol presence on the streets.
When these data are added to that of non-delegation of budgets
the reality of current BCU structures becomes immediately
apparent. While they may be identified as BCU commanders,
currently these officers effectively command very little at all.
Police Staff and Workforce Modernisation
In the event of police budgets being effectively delegated down
to the BCU there is clear evidence that BCU commanders would
prefer to make much greater use of police staff than increase
police establishment (Police Superintendents’ Association,
2003). Investing in civilian police staff is likely to provide much
greater flexibility in management terms than the employment of
yet more police officers.
This trend towards greater use of police staff has been
encouraged by the increased recruitment of Community Support
Officers (PCSOs) and can be expected to expand yet further
following on from workforce modernisation policies currently
being piloted in a number of police forces. While the results have
yet to be fully evaluated, the evidence to date suggests that the
future implementation and use of ‘mixed economy police teams’
is likely to prove highly beneficial in terms of both crime
investigation and public reassurance policing (Loveday, forth-
coming b). The expected role and function of mixed-economy
teams when linked to the expansion to around 24,000 Com-
munity Support Officers provides evidence of the nature and
extent of police reform and how this could, if fully implemented,
fundamentally alter the policing landscape in England and
Wales.
Evidence of the initial results arising from the pilot-sites has
already been publicised (Police Professional, 2006). This sug-
gests that with the use of mixed-economy teams the number of
detections has increased and the time taken to deal with them has
fallen significantly. A similar result has arisen in relation to fear
of crime among the public, where survey data indicate that
visible policing led by mixed-economy teams has also signific-
antly reduced what had proved previously to be a challenging
problem to police forces.
In the Metropolitan Police Service the Bexley pilot has
demonstrated similar gains from the expanded use of police staff.
In Bexley, for example, the use of police staff in the role of
Investigative Support-Officers (ISOs) has proved to be highly
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effective. The first significant change followed an internal evalu-
ation of the investigation and management of crime. A decision
was made to end the system where individual CID officers were
made fully responsible for investigating individual cases ‘from
cradle to grave’ and were also responsible for setting up ID
parades and collecting witness statements etc. (Metropolitan
Police Service, 2006).
The use of ISOs has meant that in relation to volume crime
(which remains a central government target) many cases can be
dealt with in much shorter time. To date no evaluation has been
undertaken of how the time freed up by the use of ISOs has been
used by CID officers. An initial assessment indicates, however,
that much more crime within the Borough has been ‘screened in’
and that many more initial leads in an investigation have been
followed up. One result was that while recorded crime was going
up the crime clearance rate was also rising (Metropolitan Police
Service, 2006).
Further evidence from the Bexley pilot site was to highlight
how the use of police staff to respond to non- emergency calls
had proved of value. An initial analysis of calls made to Bexley
OCU (Operational Command Unit) revealed nearly a third of all
such calls did not require a police response at all. Where PCSOs
responded to these calls they had in effect ‘professionalised the
mundane’ by dealing with service calls that very often the police
did not want to deal with (Metropolitan Police Service, 2006).
The use of PCSOs had been (after Ministerial confirmation)
extended to local (and high-profile) Police Response Teams
where police officers supported their inclusion. Interestingly,
analysis of calls for assistance revealed that police were 19 times
more likely to call for PCSOs than PCSOs were to call for police
support (ibid.).
Recent Research on the PCSO role
Evidence from the workforce modernisation pilot sites suggests
that mixed-economy teams have much to offer. Elsewhere recent
empirical research conducted within one force area on Police
Community Support Officers has concluded that, far from being
‘plastic policemen’ as claimed by the Police Federation, the
PCSO has proved to be pioneering (Tazzini, 2006). Evidence
from Essex Police suggests that the 600 PCSOs now employed
by the police force are demonstrating the intrinsic value of
visible patrol by the way they are ‘forging lasting personal
relationships with stakeholders in their communities and are
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beginning to enhance the social fabric of the communities they
serve’ (Tazzini, 2006).
The same research found that, in addition to enjoying closer
links with the community, the PCSO can be expected to spend
on average 49% of their time on visible patrol, which compares
very favourably with that of police officers who on average
spend just 15% of their time on visible patrol and dealing with
incidents. Additionally, where there has been evident resistance
within the police service to the introduction and expansion of
Community Support Officers their arrival has, however, chal-
lenged previously held assumptions about the role of the police
officer. Claims that PCSOs were merely plastic police ‘decries
the significant reassurance benefit that they undoubtedly provide
to communities’ where PCSOs were found already to provide a
‘crucial tool to tackle low level crime, nuisance and disorder that
blight many communities’ (Tazzini, 2006: 29). The introduction
of PCSOs is seen to fit within the government’s workforce
modernisation agenda in that:
Our mindset has previously meant that only police officers
can do policing or community safety. PCSOs alert to signals
and signal crimes in their area have changed this. It has
challenged the monopoly that sworn officers with their pay
terms and conditions have enjoyed for many core police
roles. (Tazzini, 2006: 27)
There are, however, perceived to be continuing challenges sur-
rounding the roll-out and use of PCSOs. One challenge relates to
the need to provide effective supervision of these officers. This
could be problematic if police officers slowly withdraw from
patrol activity leaving this function entirely to PCSOs. A further
challenge arises from the police organisational culture, which
will need to change for PCSOs to provide an effective service.
This is seen as providing the biggest challenge to both the PCSO
programme and the overall Police Reform Agenda. As is noted,
however:
Like other professions such as teaching we are using assist-
ants and some are against this. The rank structure of the
police officer has been set for many years and policing has
been the monopoly reserve of the police officer. Overnight
we have brought in an addition with PCSOs and some see
this as a threat. (Tazzini, 2006: 27)
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Police Organisational Culture and Workforce
Modernisation
The police culture has been the subject of considerable comment
and research over recent years (Reiner, 2000; Chan, 1997).
However, the relationship between civilian staff and police
officers has been one that from its inception has presented acute
management challenges for both civilian and police managers
(Howgrave-Graham, 1947). The role and status of civilian staff
has been the subject of ongoing debate within the police service,
which has traditionally been highly protective of its own.
The protection of civilian employee interests has also proved
to be of only limited concern to police managers. These employ-
ees have often had to depend on the police authority to provide
some, albeit limited, defence of their interests. The Police Acts
of 1994 and 1996 effectively ended this protection when the
chief constable became the budget holder and primary employer
of police staff. How effective the chief officers team (COT) has
proved to be in providing support to civilian staff has varied
among police forces. There is evidence to suggest that an
underlying resistance to the employment of civilian staff has
been a central thread running through the police culture and has
permeated the police service over many years (HMIC, 2004:
Appendix J, 71).
The number of civilian staff now accounts for approximately
35%–40% of the overall payroll within all police forces. Since
the rapid expansion of civilianisation started in the 1980s many
of the functions that have been civilianised are identified as
crucial to the effective delivery of the service. Yet this to date
has never been adequately reflected in either the status or pay
rates accorded to these officers. Indeed, in terms of professional
training, career development pay-scales and pension arrange-
ments, civilian staff have been seen (and see themselves) as
‘second-class employees’ (HMIC, 2004: Appendix J, 70).
It is within this context that the planned major expansion of
PCSOs and the move to mixed-economy teams within the
modernisation process has to be viewed. The perception remains
that for the most effective use of PCSOs there had to be a
‘change in the police culture’. This means that:
PCSO’s raison d’etre must be engrained within the psyche
of each Neighbourhood Policing Team and the whole
(police) organisation. Influencing such change requires
changing the paradigms that comprise the police culture.
(Tazzini, 2006: 27)
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It has proved extremely difficult to effect change within the
police culture, which has remained remarkably resilient and also
resistant to reform. This has, of course, been cemented by the
degree to which the Police Federation and other associations
have been able to protect police officer interests when confronted
with reform. This was demonstrated in 1993 when the major
recommendations of the Sheehy Report were very publicly
rejected (Loveday, 1998; forthcoming b).
Breaking into and breaking down the police organisational
culture is proving to be one of the greatest challenges facing
Workforce Modernisation. This is made more difficult by the
stance taken to this process by the Police Federation. It remains
a strong opponent of what it describes as ‘policing on the
cheap’. It is also highly critical of a programme that it views as
a direct threat to the status and role of its members. These
perceptions are not, however, confined to Police Federation
representatives. They may in fact permeate the whole organisa-
tion up to and including chief officer teams. This element of the
police culture has been most recently evidenced in the Devon
and Cornwall Constabulary’s senior command team. Here a
major management initiative, directed at civilian staff, was
pursued by the command team with what proved to be quite
disastrous consequences.
Meltdown at Middlemoor
In what proved to be a remarkable case of managerial misjudge-
ment, the Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Constabulary
was in 2003/4 to initiate a pay review for all civilian staff within
the police force. A planned reform, based on a performance-
related pay system, involved a wide-ranging and highly demand-
ing job evaluation of all civilian posts and current pay rates. In a
managerial project ‘of which many police staff were sceptical of
its outcome before it was announced’ the end result was a
recommendation that involved a reduction in the salaries of
hundreds of civilian staff. An unprecedented walkout of civilian
staff and public protests outside the force HQ followed the
announcement of the results of the pay review.
A series of Inquiries followed this public relations disaster
and revealed the profound lack of managerial skill exhibited
within the senior management team (Devon and Cornwall Police
Authority, 2006). It also laid bare the limited cultural horizons
that permeated the police organisation at the highest level. As the
Job Evaluation Project, targeted entirely at civilian staff pay-
rates, evolved, it became apparent that financial imperatives
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overshadowed human resource considerations. This did not
appear to be a matter of any immediate concern to either the
chief officer or senior management team. A report prepared for
the Police Authority was to comment:
It appears that there was a lack of interest, involvement and
attention from senior management to the project, its progress
and particularly, its implications – despite its potential
impact on 40% of the workforce. (Devon and Cornwall
Police Authority, 2006: 10)
The same report commented that in the course of the Job
Evaluation Project any challenges to or notes of caution about
the management of the project, along with potential outcomes,
were met with ‘at best indifference and at worst with hostility’
(Devon and Cornwall Police Authority, 2006: 11). It also found
that the project had not been helped by the complete lack of
human resources expertise among both ACPO and other senior
police personnel (ibid.).
The absence of any expertise held by chief police officers
had not acted as any kind of brake on the Project. It does,
however, explain the numerous major failings later identified
within it by the Police Authority. These failures included, inter
alia, an absence of any enquiry as to whether other forces had
undertaken similar job evaluation projects and with what result;
a failure to seek any external advice or support for the project; a
failure to engage with any of the relevant trade unions or staff
line-managers; a failure to identify what specialist skills and
competencies were necessary to undertake the job evaluation
process and the failure to evaluate other potential job evaluation
schemes prior to determining the scheme to be adopted (Devon
and Cornwall Police Authority, 2006).
Led by a senior police officer who also had to exercise ‘day
to day responsibility for the South Devon force’, the project team
lacked any expertise in either the HR field or that of job
evaluation. The fact that the scheme related only to civilian staff
and not police establishment possibly explains why the absence
of any professional skills held by members of the Project Team
were not deemed by chief officers to be a matter of concern.
Later claims of impropriety, relating in part to the shredding
of documents linked to the Project by members of the Project
Team, only served to highlight the degree of suspicion among
civilian staff that surrounded the project (Herald Express, 2006).
The seizure of all (remaining) documents by an internal police
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investigation team and a subsequent follow-up investigation
conducted by the Metropolitan Police did not wholly assuage
these apparently justifiable suspicions.
Evidence from the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary case
only provides further support for an assessment made some years
before on the impact of civilianisation on the police service. In
an insightful evaluation of the civilianisation process one senior
police officer earlier expressed great concern as to the future
management of civilian staff.
Parrett (1998) noted that despite the implementation of the
Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act in 1994, which passed
effective responsibility for all civilian staff from the police (or
local) authority to the chief constable, little or nothing had
resulted from this significant change in responsibility. Parrett
also argued that while the legislation provided an ‘important and
symbolic’ opportunity for chief officers to welcome civilian staff
into the police service and also for the police service to
‘unequivocally present its vision for the civilianisation process’,
this opportunity had been entirely missed (Parrett, 1998: 223).
Going for the Big Bang
It would be wrong to generalise from the Devon and Cornwall
experience where bad management, emanating from the senior
command team, alienated all staff across the police–civilian
divide. Yet the central feature of job evaluation undertaken by
that force provides a disturbing insight into the perceptions of
civilian staff held even at the most senior level. This does not
exactly augur well for the expansion of community support
officers. The lack of leadership among police staff in that case
may also serve to reinforce a negative stereotype of ‘police staff’
already prevalent within the police organisational culture. This
can be expected also to create a significant barrier to the
successful implementation of workforce modernisation and
raises fundamental questions as to how this important reform
programme can be effectively implemented.
One way forward could be to provide an opportunity for
BCU commanders to initiate the reform process by giving them
the control of the manpower budget that to date has been denied
them. Control of the budget is likely to lead to a substantial
increase in police staff numbers as BCU commanders seek to
maximise value for money by spending on staffing that is likely
to provide the greatest immediate return and long-term benefit.
This will inevitably mean a significant expansion of police staff,
mixed-economy teams and PCSOs. Evidence to date clearly
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suggests that the latter initiatives have already proved their worth
(HMIC, 2004: Appendix J, 84).
As the surveys of BCU commanders show, one of the most
critical issues confronting commanders remains that of staffing.
Although a range of problems were identified, the most sig-
nificant was the number of police and civilian staff available to
commanders. A further difficulty related to replacing those off
sick or seconded to other parts of the force, particularly those
seconded to police headquarters. As the Police Superintendents’
Survey and report noted:
Aside from ongoing problems of recruitment and retention
many respondents felt there was insufficient flexibility to
vary the mix of staff particularly between police and civilian
staff. Where officers had been given the authority and
flexibility to change the mix of staff (they) reported that they
had been able to minimise the problems of staff shortages by
using specialist staff resources (be they police or civilian)
where they would be most effective. This however was
closely linked to whether commanders had been delegated
both budgets and responsibility for staffing. (Police Super-
intendents’ Association, 2003: 6.2)
It is clear that for BCU commanders, the single most important
factor in BCU performance is the availability and competence of
both police officers and civilian staff. For a number of com-
manders one way of addressing staff shortages, particularly
among officers, is being able to alter the balance between
civilian staff and police officers and this means essentially
‘having more civilian staff’. This in turn would allow police
officers to focus on ‘real police work’, which might involve the
use of their powers of arrest while civilian staff undertake
‘traditional officer tasks like conducting interviews’ (Police
Superintendents’ Association, 2003: 4.2.3).
Ultimately, however, none of this can be entertained in the
absence of control by commanders over the budget. While in a
number of forces devolved responsibility for budgets has taken
place, it remains the case that most of the budget goes on wages
and, without control over officer staffing (which generally
remains with headquarters), there is little left in the budget to
allocate at their own discretion (Police Superintendents’ Asso-
ciation, 2003: 4.5). Not surprisingly therefore most commanders
registered frustration over the fact that while they were made
accountable they could not make budgeting decisions. They were
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in effect made accountable for performance but ‘could not
control things that affect that performance’ (ibid.).
Should the problem of delegated budgets be resolved, this
might enable the BCU commander to deal with a number of
current problems. These included the high turnover rate of
officers, which within inner-city BCUs now invariably means
that policing is the responsibility of probationer constables
(Police Superintendents’ Association, 2003: 4.2.2). Control of
the budget would also enable these officers to respond to the
problem of staff–shortages, which currently remains the primary
characteristic of all BCUs. While staff shortages can be
explained in part through unfilled vacancies, sick leave and
annual leave, there are a number of commanders who ‘express
concern over how to handle staff seen as malingering’ and who
feel that ‘the benefits of the pension scheme encouraged some
staff to “sit out” their time before retirement’ (Police Super-
intendents’ Association, 2003: 4.2.1).
Control of the budget might also enable local commanders to
address the perennial problem of the abstraction rate through
increased recruitment of police staff. BCU commanders also feel
that playing a greater role in budgeting would put commanders
in a better position to address local priorities (Police Super-
intendents’ Association, 2003: 4.5). Arguably the identification
and response to local need should be the highest priority within a
BCU command and any impediments to realising this objective
need to be challenged immediately.
Conclusion
There are clear advantages to the effective delegation of budgets
to BCU level. This should be accompanied with the ending of
the Crime Fighting Fund (CFF), which is designed to push up
police establishment levels across the country. Effectively used
as a means to ‘ring-fence’ spending on police officers, this
government-led initiative now acts as a strait-jacket within police
forces as spending can be directed only to police numbers and
not to civilian staff. One interesting consequence of this policy
has been that currently local commanders are now having to
remove operational police from street patrol to take on admin-
istrative office-based functions as police civilian staff leave and
cannot be replaced. Ironically therefore the CFF is now working
to reduce visible patrol strength rather than increase this import-
ant function.
Ending the CFF would, along with delegated budgets, allow
local BCU commanders for the first time to determine the profile
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of the BCU in ways that would maximise the impact of police
resources. This would almost certainly involve a major expan-
sion of specialised civilian staff at BCU level, who would have
expertise in a range of IT and other support services. It would
also provide a launch-pad for the roll-out of significant modern-
isation within the service. This would begin to address problems
surrounding staff shortages, current abstraction rates and a
number of employment practices that are now a matter of
concern to local commanders.
Delegated budgets would also encourage the much-needed
implementation of Workforce Modernisation. The recruitment of
police staff at BCU level would also begin to challenge elements
of the police organisational culture that to date have proved so
intractable to reform. This has not been achieved in part because
at chief officer level there continues to be an indifference (or
residual animosity) to civilian personnel. This could yet con-
found a reform programme that is predicated upon a greatly
expanded role for such staff. Research indicates that many BCU
commanders would seek to employ many more police staff and
fewer police officers, which reflects a perceived need for far
greater flexibility to vary the mix of staff particularly between
police and civilian staff.
Similarly the much-increased demands on police resources
arising from the new Neighbourhood Policing Strategy may also
pave the way to major reform. In the absence of a substantial
increase in police establishments Neighbourhood Policing Strat-
egy, which is highly manpower-intensive, may be accomplished
only through significant increases in police staff linked to an
expanded role for both PCSOs and mixed-economy teams.
Recent evidence suggesting that central funding may not
match planned manning levels could mean that local authorities
may become part-funding bodies for this purpose (Johnston,
2006). This would place greater pressure on police forces and in
particular BCU commanders to achieve ‘value for money’ and
therefore act as a further incentive to employ more police staff.
Much will ultimately depend on the degree and extent of budget
and manpower delegation to BCU commands. At this point, the
evidence suggests, it will be at BCU command level where
police re-engineering, along with workforce modernisation, is
most likely to be implemented successfully. Therefore it will be
here that these initiatives can be expected either to succeed or
fail and it is at this level that the successful implementation of
future police service delivery will be ultimately determined.
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